A t independence, observers hoped that the new states of Black Africa would successfully address the problems of economic and social development within the framework of civilian constitutional regimes and avoid the human costs of military political interventions, e.g., political repression, human rights violations, internal conflicts, and the diversion of scarce economic resources into wars and military build-ups. These hopes have largely been destroyed by pervasive military coups d'ktat, military governments, and political instability. Between 1960 and 1982, almost 90 percent of the 45 independent Black African states experienced a military coup, an attempted coup, or a plot (Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984, p. 646) . During the course of some 115 legal governmental changes, these states experienced 52 successful coups, 56 attempted coups, and 102 plots, malung the military ' We have benefited from the advice of York Bradshaw, Kevin Leicht, Ekkart Zimmermann, members of the African Studies Center Seminar at Ohio State University, and anonymous referees. Zwelakhe Tshandu, Robert Jackman, Pat McGowan, Shawn McIntee, and Elvis Fraser helped with the data and the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University provided financial assistance. AnnetteLendacki provided the line drawings and straightened out the text. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Studies Association meetings in April, 1989 in London, England. coup "the institutionalized mechanism for succession" in postcolonial Black Africa (Young 1988, p. 57) ' In the late 1980s, the central executive of 25 of these 45 states was in military hands and the military remained a powerful force in most other states (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, pp. xxiii-xxviii) . Restraints on human rights and political expression remain among the highest in the world and military expenditures remain high despite major economic problems (Sivard 1983, p. 10) . Political conflicts ranging from protest demonstrations to riots and open rebellions have made these some of the most unstable states in the world (Gurr 1989, pp. 113-15) .
We examine the structural sources of military coups d'Ctat in postcolonial Black Africa. We define a military coup as an irregular transfer of a state's chief executive by the regular armed forces or internal security forces through the use (or threat) of force. We exclude nonmilitary irregular transfers such as cabinet reshufflings and palace coups that lack military participation. The "new nations" of Black Africa form a region with some of the highest rates of military coups in the world (Zirnmermann 1979, pp. 387-91) . We are thus able to build on the work of area experts who have extensively documented coup proData on regular government changes are from the machine-readable version of Taylor and Jodice (1 983). Data on coups come from Johnson, Slater, and McGowan (1984, p. 627 ).
American Sociological Review, 1990.Vol. 55 (December:861-875) cesses. Our central concern is the problem of political control in less developed countries (LDCs). Several decades ago, Myrdal (1968) argued that the key development problem confronting LDCs was a "soft state" lacking institutional controls and therefore resorting to military rule and repression. Recent analysts have echoed this concern, arguing that the African state is simultaneously "weak and powerful, repressive and feeble, fragile and absolutist, dependent and autonomous" (Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothchild 1988, p. 38; Migdal 1988) . Recurrent military coups and military governments are symptoms of this problematic political control.
Recent studies of African coups provide partial support for political development theory (Huntington 1968; Smaldone 1974; Kasfir 1976; Finer 1988) , military centrality arguments (Andreski 1968; Nordlinger 1977; Wells 1974; Wells and Pollnac 1988) , several theories of ethnic antagonism (Morrison and Stevenson 1972a, 1972b; Jackman 1978; Enloe 1980; Horowitz 1985, pp. 443-525) , and economic dependency theory (O'Kane 1981; Johnson et al. 1984) . However, these theories have several limitations. They have been treated largely as single propositions evaluated by case analysis or conventional regression techniques. We believe these are complex theories with multiple causal links that should be evaluated with complex causal models. We use the index construction and path analytic techniques available through LISREL VI. Second, several studies have produced conflicting results regarding the role of ethnic antagonism. Jackman (1978) found that ethnic dominance promoted coups, while Morrison and Stevenson (1972a, 1972b) and McGowan (1975) found that ethnic diversity was a destabilizing influence. Barrows (1976) and Wells and Pollnac (1988) , on the other hand, concluded that ethnicity was irrelevant once military centrality and weak political institutions were considered. These studies, however, have dealt with ethnicity in a simplistic fashion by focusing on political underrepresentation while ignoring underlying sources of ethnic antagonism. We reframe this discussion in terms of theories of ethnic mobilization (Olzak 1983; Olzak and Nagel 1986; See and Wilson 1988) and draw on a richer body of data about ethnic relations.
RECENT RESEARCH AND A SYNTHETIC MODEL OF MILITARY COUPS
Probably the most prominent explanation of military coups stems frompolitical development AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW theory (Huntington 1968; Deutsch 1969; Finer 1988) . Focusing on the political problems of "new nations," the basic argument is that political institution-building has failed to keep pace with economic development and its resulting upsurge in social mobilization and political participation. By creating political awareness and capacities for political action, social mobilization increases political participation and political demands. The postcolonial states in Africa did not respond effectively to these demands. As former colonies, they inherited patrimonial and clientelistic administrations that lacked sufficient "adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence" to rule effectively (Huntington 1968, p. 194) . Colonial rule weakened traditional authority structures and created exclusionary regimes, leaving behind widespread distrust and weak elitelmass linkages. Military professionalism was weak, encouraging interventions. Nor did the new civilian leaders institute stable inclusionary regimes. Many states adopted constitutional systems that created factionalized multiparty regimes, producing political stalemates and unresponsive governments. When these regimes failed to respond to rising popular demands, the military intervened and instituted exclusionary or "departicipation" measures that provoked further coups and political instabilities, e.g., Kasfir's (1976) analysis of Uganda.
Military centrality theory focuses more narrowly on the corporate interests and resources of the military and on civiVmilitary relations (Welch and Smith 1974; Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1988) . In less developed countries, the military is often the most powerful institution, with more resources and organizational coherence than the civilian government. Because of common training and nationalistic sentiments, military officers are often the most cohesive elite group (Kennedy 1974) . Colonialism also left a military trained for internal control, encouraging an orientation toward domestic politics. In several African states, the officer corps was Africanized immediately after independence, symbolizing national sovereignty while encouraging political aspirations among the military (Smaldone 1974, pp. 209 (Nordlinger 1977;  but also see Thompson 1980) . A third set of arguments centers on the destabilizing consequences of ethnic antagonisms, both those inside the military and in the broader polity (Morrison and Stevenson 1972a, 1972b; Collier 1983; Jackman 1978; Mazrui and Tidy 1984; Enloe 1980; Horowitz 1985) . While advancing diverse hypotheses about the sources of these conflicts, these analyses build on the common argument that ethnic antagonisms create political tensions and result in military coups. They begin with the simple observation that, compared to developed states, "new nations" are more culturally diverse and lack strong integrative institutions and symbols. The question then becomes: What politicizes this ethnic diversity so that the military intervenes?
There are at least three explanations that focus on ethnic antagonism (for a broader discussion, see Olzak 1983, and See and Wilson 1988) . Modernization theory argues that rapid economic development sets off ethnic political revivals rooted in atavistic responses to the social dislocations of rapid industrialization and urbanization (e.g., Deutsch 1969; Smelser 1968) . Rapid development produces social dislocation, creating social alienation and a search for a stable identity that makes groups susceptible to ethnic mobilization. Insofar as the forces of assimilation (common schooling, language standardization, exposure to modem values) lag behind these "uprooting" processes, leaving extensive cultural plurality and strong atavistic tendencies, ethnic groups mobilize and press claims for political power (including separatist struggles), thereby provoking military coups.
A second tack is ethnic competition theory (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1974 Bates , 1983 Young 1976; Olzak 1983; Olzak and Nagel 1986) . Building on human ecology and resource mobilization theories, the central argument is that "as groups come to compete in the same labor markets and increase their access to similar sets of political, economic and social resources, ethnic mobilization will occur" (Olzak 1983, p. 362) . The starting point is a cultural division of labor rooted in the colonial era. In contrast with the uprooting hypothesis, modernization is seen as creating conflict by increasing intergroup competition and political resources. Economic development, for example, breaks up a traditional cultural division of labor and brings previously separate groups into competition in the same labor market while simultaneously providing increased resources. Similarly, urbanization creates competition for housing and urban amenities such as schools and services while creating geographic proximity that facilitates group mobilization. Building a centralized state intensifies competition for public sector jobs, licenses and contracts, and symbolic recognition, especially if a regime provides incentives for organizing around subgroup or regional identities while providing leadership and organizational opportunities for different groups (Young 1976; Brass 1985; Horowitz 1985) . Competition also intensifies when a limited number of roughly comparable competitors are unable to dominate the political center (Horowitz 1985, p. 37) . Borrowing on Korpi's (1974) power-balance theory of conflict, the more closely contending groups approach parity in resources, the greater the intensity of conflict. Ethnic competition, then, increases the likelihood of military coups.
Ethnic dominance theory takes the opposite position -it is the political and economic dominance of a single group that creates instability. Drawing on political theories of tyrannical majorities, Jackman (1978) argued that large and resourceful groups typically dominate smaller groups, provoking ethnic challenges and coup attempts. While this formulation lacks a clear sociological foundation, the argument can be broadened by linking it to theories of ethnic stratification. If powerful groups monopolize privileged positions such as cabinet posts, top military appointments, or the ownership of major enterprises, this dominance will mobilize subordinate groups to contest these monopolies (Brass 1985, pp. 29-30) . The result is ethnic conflict and elite instability, including military coups.
A final explanation focuses on problems of economic dependency, arguing that distorted development and slow economic growth provoke domestic instabilities, thereby spurring military intervention (O'Donnell 1979; O'Kane 1981; Johnson et al. 1984) . Less developed countries are often dependent on a limited number of export commodities, on low returns from labor-intensive production of primary products, and on the direct investments and loans of transnational comorations. These processes create distorted and uneven development, economic inequality, severe balance of trade problems and unemployment, and a general of economic stagnation that generates widespread social unrest ( Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) . These export-dependent enclaves also rest on the political exclusion of the lower classes. Typically they are authoritarian regimes that rely on a strong military establishment (Paige 1975; 0'Donne11 1979; Thomas 1984; Timberlake and Williams 1984) . Several analysts have therefore argued that the greater the economic dependence, the stronger the military and the greater the likelihood of military intervention. Figure 1outlines the major hypotheses in these theories. In past research, these have been treated as single propositions rather than as part of a complex causal argument. Moreover, analysts have typically examined their favorite hypotheses without considering possible points of synthesis or alternative ex~lanations. Yet there are several points of convergence: Political development and ethnic competition theories, for example, both argue that economic development increases mobilization and political factionalization but point to different intervening processes (i.e., rising participation vs. ethnic conflict) as creating coups. Similarly, economic dependence and political development theories argue that authoritarian regimes are rooted in the labor controls of export enclaves and the weak institutions of postcolonial states, respectively. Ethnic tension; have often been controlled with force and may well create stronger military establishments. In short, these hypotheses need to be examined as part of more complex synthetic models of military coups.
Figure 2 outlines such a synthetic formulation.*We have treated the major structural factors as exogenous variables and, except for the negative relation between economic dependence and rapid development, assumed weak positive associations among them. Military centrality, however, is seen as rooted in weak political institutions and economic dependence and is incorporated as an intervening variable. We have also simplified these theories by eliminating factors that do not vary or for which we could not develop good measurements. Given our sample of former colonies, decolonization does not vary. The intervening ethnic processes (i.e., atavism and ethnic mobilization) could not be reliably measured so we treated these in terms of structuralvariables. When attempting to construct separate indicators of the three ethnic theories, we found that ethnic diversity, competition, and dominance could not be separately identified. Therefore, we constructed a composite indicator of ethnic antagonism using the loadings of particular items to predict a positive effect of ethnic diversity and competition and a negative one for ethnic dominance.
DATA AND METHOD

Research Design
We evaluate these arguments using a cross-sectional design and the structural equation estimation procedures available through the Linear Structural Relations Program (LISREL), Version VI (Joreskog and Sorbom 1983) .Complex social structures such as systems of ethnic relations and political regimes are best conceived of as latent (or unobserved) variables tapped by several measures. Our dependent variable -the structural propensity for military coups -is best considered as a latentdimension captured by three types of coup events -reported plots, attempted coups, and successful coups. Because our concern is identifying the latent factors explaining the likelihood of these coup events, we need a statistical method that combines a confirmatory factor analysis with an analysis of structural relations. LISREL VI allows us to first construct such a 'For a similar attempt at a synthetic theory that ignores economic dependence and military centrality, see Zimmermann (1983, p. 283-86). coup indicator and the structural sources of coups along with their error terms, and then, as a second step, to use these to estimate the coefficients and error terms in a series of structural equation models. We present both maximum likelihood estimates and standardized coefficients, using a .10 significance level because of the small number of cases. As in conventional regression analysis, the effects of exogenous variables are tested independently of the variance shared with other variables.
Because our concern is explaining the structural likelihood of military coups, we have used a cross-sectional design with a time-lag between the exogenous variables and the coup events. The exogenous measures were calculated at or near the date at which these states became independent (primarily 1960-1964) . Our dependent variable is constructed from the number of coup events that occurred during the subsequent period between 1957 (the earliest independence date, that of Ghana) and 1984. In other words, our causal assumption is that the social structures and institutions existing at or near independence (e.g., ethnic relations circa 1960) produce a certain likelihood of coup events over the subsequent 25-year period of independence.' For a few variables, data availability dictated that we use slightly later dates for our independent variables (see Appendix Table 1 for a description of the variables, the measures, and data sources). Since these are structural factors (e.g., export dependency) "Alternative designs such as time-series or event history analyses were not possible because of the lack of annual event data.
that are quite stable, these should be valid measures.
Our sample consists of the 33 states of subSaharan lack Africa that were independent by Sample selection was guided by a comparable-cases strategy (Lijphart 1975 ) of looking at similar systems, i.e., recently decolonized Blackcontrolled states. While we cannot capture the full variation in some factors, such as economic dependence, this provides a useful starting point. These states have also been the subject of considerable cross-national analysis, allowing us to build on this past work. Our particular sample departs slightly from past studies because of slight differences in temporal coverage and data availability. Collier (1983) , for example, used 26 states for 1960 -75, Jackman (1978 ) used 29 and 30 states for 1960 -75, Morrison and Stevenson (1972a , 1972b used 32 states for 1956-69, and Johnson et al. (1984) studied 35 states for 1960-82. To check for outliers and assess the goodness-of-fit of our equations, we inspected the Qplot of normalized residuals for our primary model and found no significant departures from normality. The slope of the normalized residuals was consistently greater than 1, indicating a good fit of the model as a whole and an absence of outliers. Thus, our findings do not appear to be the result of the inclusion of deviant cases.
The Measurement Model
Coup propensity. To examine the structural propensity for military coups, we constructed a latent variable as our dependent variable, using the number of reported plots, attempted coups, and successful coups for the period 1957-1984 as reported by McGowan and Johnson (1986) . Past work relied exclusively on the military intervention index devised by Morris~n and Stevenson (1972a) that differentially weights successful coups, attempted coups, and reported plots and classifies each coup event by its final endpoint. This scale, however, is designed to capture an assumed coup "intensity" rather than the structural likelihood of coup events. Because successful coups begin as attempted coups and attempted coups begin as plots, we decided to treat these as three interrelated measures of an underlying propensity for coups. Therefore, we constructed our coup indicator from the linear composites shared by the number of plots, attempted coups, and successful coups. Finally, to control for differential exposure to coup events (since only independent states, by our definition, can experience coups), we divided total coup events for each country by the years of independence. Appendix Table 1 reports the results of the measurement model. (For a fuller discussion of the coup measures, see Johnson et al. 1984 ; for an analysis of these and other measures of elite instability, see our discussion [Jenkins and Kposowa 19901) .
Independent variables. Except for political participation, our exogenous and intervening variables are based on a variety of observed measures. Appendix Table 1 lists the major variables, their measures, and sources of data. To standardize these measures, we log transformed all measures whose skewness statistic was .9 or more (as indicated by an [L] in the label). Rapid development was based on change scores for two indices of economic development: change in the percent of industrial labor force, 1965-1975 ; and growth in the percent of the population residing in urban areas, 1965-75. Social mobilization was tapped by four measures: the literacy rate; newspaper circulation per capita; the number of radios per capita; and the per capita secondary school enrollment. Because of extensive electoral irregularities after independence, the only reliable AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW measure of conventional political participation was the turnout at the elections held by the colonial powers immediately prior to formal independence. We therefore treated the latent participation variable as isomorphic with this measure, fixing the loading at 1 and the measured variable's error at 0. To capture political factionalism, we used three measures: a party factionalization index for the immediate post-independence legislatures; multipartyism, a dummy variable (0 = one-party; 1 =two or more parties) characterizing the regime immediately prior to the first successful coup or 1967 if no coup had yet occurred; and, predicting a negative loading, the electoral strength of the leading party in the pre-independence elections5 Since these factionalism measures also capture the plurality of the electoral system, we afso interpret these as indexes of political plurality.
The most complex variable is ethnic antagonism. Since direct measures of the cultural division of labor and ecological measures of competition are unavailable, we constructed an index using several demographic items and data on the ethnic backgrounds of cabinets. Initially, we constructed three indicators representing ethnic diversity, competition, and dominance. However. these measures roved so interrelated that se'parate constructs' could not be identified. Therefore, we constructed a single ethnic antagonism variable, arguing that, since diversity is a precondition for ethnic competition, these measures should load together and that, because diversity is the mathematical inverse of dominance, diversity and competition should load inversely from the dominance measures. This created a composite ethnic antagonism measure allowing us to distinguish diversity and competition effects from dominance effects by predicting a positive effect for diversity and competition and a negative effect for dominance (see Appendix Table 1 ).
In constructing the ethnic antagonism measures. we assumed that data based on ethnic selfidentification would be more relevant than clusters defined by common cultural traits6 To capture ethnic diversity, we used four measures: the number of ethnic groups; and the three cultural diversity scores developed by Morrison, Mitchell, Paden, and Stevenson (1972, pp. 172,174) to For Ethiopia's voter turnout, we used the 1957 elections and substituted the mean value for party dominance (Morrison et al. 1972, pp. 102-3) .
This contrasts with past analyses which have used the abstract clusters as the relevant groups. Ethnic data on Swaziland came from Hoffman (1989) . tap variation in the cultural characteristics of colonial-era groups in terms of their extra-family hierarchy, community organization, and political authority. These should have persisted into the post-independence era and formed the basis for ethnic mobilization. To capture competition and dominance, we emphasized relational measures. According to competition theory, the stronger the second largest group relative to the largest group, the more likely is ethnic mobilization. We therefore used six measures of the competitive position of the second largest group: the second largest group as a percent of the population; the ratio of the second largest group to the dominant group; countries in which the second largest group is 20 percent or more of the population (a dummy variable coded as 0 = less than 20 percent; 1 = 20 percent or more); the ratio of speakers of the second most common language to speakers of the dominant language; the second group's representation in the post-independence cabinet; and the second group's percent in the immediate pre-coup cabinet (or 1967 if a coup had not yet occurred). To tap ethnic dominance, we focused on the resources of the largest ethnic group: the largest group as a percent of the population; language dominance as based on the percent speakers of the dominant group's language and on the percent speakers of the major vernacular; and the largest group's percent in the post-independence cabinet.
Military centrality theory emphasizes the size, cohesion, and the budget claims of the military and its autonomy from civilian leaders. Using Andreski's (1968) military centrality index, we used the number of troops and internal security forces, and the defense budget as a percent of GNP. In several African states, early and thorough Africanization of the military officer corps politicized the military, making it into a symbol of the new national identity and creating a cohesive military leadership. This may have encouraged military interventions, so we included the index of the Africanization of the officer corps (Morrison et al. 1972, p. 120) , ranging from no change to complete Africanization (1 to 6),to create a coherent military centrality variable.
Almost all of the African states have been dependent economically on the export of a limited number of primary products. Foreign investments and, most recently, growing external debt and debt service loads have created economic strains. To capture "classical" or export dependence, we used two measures of export vulnerability: the value of primary products exports (excluding oil) as a percent of total exports; and a commodity concentration index based on the top three export items as a percent of total exports. To capture foreign capital penetration, we used three measures: the stock of foreign private investments relative to GDP; foreign debt relative to GNP; and the debt service load (debt payments divided by total export earnings). We initially predicted these would load together as a general index of economic dependence, but the foreign capital penetration items did not, creating a nonpositive definite matrix. Inspecting a correlation matrix of these measures, we found that there were three distinct types of dependence: export dependence, based on the two export items; foreign investment dependence, based on the single foreign investment measure; and debt dependence, based on the two debt measures (see Appendix Table  2 ). We therefore constructed three separate dependency variables and estimated structural equations for four models, one using each type of dependency as a separate exogenous factor and one combining the effects of all three. Figure 3 reports the results of the structural equations for the strongest total prediction model, the model using export dependence as an exogenous ~ariable.F igures 4 and 5 show the results for the models using foreign investment dependence and debt dependency, respectively. We also estimated a model using the effects of all three forms of dependency but it produced weaker results for both coups and the model as a whole and is not shown. In general, we found the strongest support for the modernization and competition theories of ethnic antagonism, military centrality theory, and dependency theory. The strongest predictors of coups were ethnic antagonism and military centrality, with political factionalism significant in some of the models. Of the dependency variables, debt dependence was the only direct source of coups. Export dependence and foreign investment dependence had indirect effects by boosting military centrality. The positive sign on the effect of ethnic antagonism indicates that it was ethnic diversity and the competition between the largest and the second largest group that created the coups. In other words, ethnic dominance was a net source of political stability. As for political development theory, the classic argument about rapid development creating a participation 'TO save space, metric coefficients are not reported here; they are available from the authors on request. "overload" and a factionalized regime received no support. Political factionalism, however, emerged as a significant or near significant source of coups and, in some models, contributed to military centrality, suggesting that it bears further attention independent of its relevance to political development theory.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Our strongest results pertain to ethnic antagonism. Ethnic diversity and competition have consistently strong effects on social mobilization and military coups. When export dependence is the measure of economic dependence, diversity and competition also strengthen the military, indirectly promoting coups. But, if foreign investment dependence and debt dependence are the measures, ethnic antagonism does not have significant effects, indicating that dependence is a stronger overall explanation of military centrality. Ethnic dominance, of course, works in the opposite direction, creating greater social homogeneity and reducing the resources of other groups, thereby stabilizing regimes -groups are less likely to mobilize, there is less pressure to build up a strong military, and the military is less likely to seize power. In the same vein, ethnic diversity and competition encourage groups to mobilize, boosting literacy levels, school enrollments, and media access in a bid for political and economic power. These antagonisms, as well as the size and heterogeneity of states with large populations, lead to more powerful military establishments and a greater likelihood of military coups.
Can these findings be reconciled with Jackman's (1978) evidence on the destabilizing effects of ethnic dominance? One possibility is that our results may be influenced by the inclusion of three additional cases (Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana) with strong dominant groups and few military interventions. Yet the Q-plots revealed no outliers, indicating that this is not the reason. Another possibility is that diversity and competition simply overshadow dominance. Yet the factor analysis showed that dominance is not distinct from diversity and competition but rather is their inverse. It seems more plausible to conclude that ours is simply a better index of the structural sources of ethnic antagonism. By using a broader range of measures, especially the variety of measures of ethnic antagonism, and by using-information on self-identified groups, we have better captured the underlying structure of ethnic antagonism.
The consistently strong effect of ethnic dominance on electoral participation and, to a lesser extent, political factionalism is, however, puzzling. If ethnic competition theory is correct, we would expect competing groups to mobilize be- hind separate parties thereby creating more factionalized legislatures and higher electoral turnout. Perhaps ethnic competition had not fully developed by the pre-independence elections and the early independence legislatures. In an earlier analysis, Collier (1983, pp. 92-4) concluded that the dominant groups mobilized behind single parties, creating a more cohesive political elite which, in turn, mobilized higher turnout, thereby legitimizing electoral institutions and eventually creating more stable civilian regimes. In more pluralistic states, the political leadership was less cohesive, which led to lower turnout, greater factionalism, and weaker regimes. In other words, the political development arguments about rapid development boosting mobilization, participation levels, and factionalism are erroneous according to our evidence, except that ethnic dominance also created slightly more factionalized, multiparty regimes. These factionalized regimes tended to have more coups and a stronger military establishment. Although the factionalizing effect of ethnic dominance is not strong or consistent, this is an anomalous finding that bears further examination.
Military centrality is the most consistent independent force behind coups, a finding supported by earlier studies (Wells 1974; Johnson et al. 1984; Wells and Pollnac 1988) . The stronger the resources of the military and the greater the cohesion of the officer corps, the more likely were military interventions. This held up across all models and was a consistently strong predictor of coups. Successful coups probably reinforced this relationship, giving the military an even stronger hand, but since our military measures predate the coups, this would not account for this finding.
The puzzle then is to explain military centrality. A strong military is rooted in all three types of economic dependence, ethnic diversity and competition (at least in some models), and, to a lesser extent, factionalized regimes. In other words, economic dependence creates a stronger military, supporting dependency arguments about the authoritarian and repressive nature of peripheral states. Export dependence is slightly stronger and is independent of the other types of dependence, suggesting that export enclaves are the most likely to have a strong military. Ethnic antagonism is significant when the model includes export dependence, but not when foreign investment dependence and debt dependence are included. Foreign investments and loans were concentrated in the more populous states and these were also the states with greater ethnic diversity and competition, making these competing explanations. Export dependence, however, was sufficiently distinct so that ethnic antagonism emerged as an independent factor. In sum, ethnic antagonism and economic dependence are partially competing explanations of military centrality, with economic dependence the stronger factor overall.
The evidence on dependency theory is complex. We used three types of dependence and, in addition to predicting coups, dependency should shape several intervening processes. Export dependence created the strongest model with an adjusted total coefficient of determination of .685, compared to .604 for foreign investment dependence and .578 for debt dependence. In predicting coups, the model incorporating debt dependence provided a slightly stronger prediction with a standardized coefficient of .467, compared to .418 for export dependence and .401 for foreign investment dependence. The fourth model failed to provide a significant improvement over the models with only one type of dependence (total coefficient of determination = .5 12;R2 =.468), SO we focused on the three separate models.
In terms of the three models, economic dependence consistently created greater military centrality and reduced political factionalism, indicating that the more dependent states are dominated by authoritarian regimes with strong military establishments and single-party govemments. While this does not show which groups have been excluded politically, it seems likely that it has been the lower classes and the weaker ethnic groups. The different types of dependence, however, did not have consistent effects on political participation: Foreign investment dependence boosted participation while the other two were insignificant. It may be that foreign investments created a larger educated middle class and more cohesive lower classes, thereby boosting electoral turnout, while export dependence and indebtedness did not. Foreign investors may also have encouraged electoral participation, thereby legitimizing the new civilian regimes. In view of the timing of the participation item, this is not a surprise.
As for the probability of coups, the primary effects were indirect through strengthening the military. Debt dependence was the only type of economic dependence with a direct effect. There are at least three possible explanations. A significant portion of this debt was probably created by arms purchases and military assistance contracts by the newly independent states. Foreign debt, then, was linked to a strong military and also directly encouraged military interventions. A second possibility is that focusing on Black Africa reduces the variation in export dependence and investment dependence, obscuring their ef-fects. By looking only at peripheral states, these dependencies varied so little that they had little effect on coups whereas a larger sample of states might show stronger effects. While this is possible, there is significant variation in export vulnerabilities and foreign investments within Black Africa. If these forms of dependence are consistent and powerful forces, they should show up even in this sample.
Finally, it may be that these dependencies did not have their predicted effects on economic development. All three forms of dependence were positively associated with rapid development, indicating that they contributed to economic growth and development. Of course, these development measures are limited to the period of initial independence. In the 1960s and early 1970s, prices for African exports were generally high, fueling economic expansion. By the mid-1970s, however, prices fell, creating serious economic problems. Similarly, foreign investments and loans may also have been short-term economic stimuli for the "capital starved" new states, with negative effects becoming evident only much later (see Bradshaw and Tshandu 1990) . It also seems likely that foreign investments and loans were targeted on strong states that had the fiscal resources to control internal conflict and that would therefore be less vulnerable to coups. Further analysis is needed to see the full range of effects on economic growth.
The clearest set of findings is the evidence against political development theory. None of the major hypotheses worked, with the sole exception of political factionalism. Social mobilization and political participation were rooted in ethnic diversity; participation levels had little to do with factionalism; and factionalism was rooted in export dependence and investment dependence. The spectre of a political crisis rooted in the strains of rapid development has long haunted analyses of political instability. Yet several studies of African coups, including our own, have militated against this argument (Jackman 1978; Collier 1983; Johnson et al. 1984) . As for multipartyism and the political stalemates that it presumably creates, it may well merit the blame that analysts have assigned it. However, this is not due to participation levels, but to the economic and ethnic structures of these states. Participation itself is probably a stabilizing force.
By treating ethnic antagonism, economic dependence, and rapid development as exogenous factors, we assumed that these were relatively independent forces. For the model incorporating debt dependence, this is the case (Figure 5 ). The other two models, however, showed strong associations between dependence and rapid development, which militates against dependency arguments (Figures 3 and 4) . There is also a strong association between foreign capital penetration and ethnic diversity, suggesting that large, heterogeneous states were more likely to be the targets of foreign investment and loans. In these two models, ethnic antagonism had weaker effects on military centrality and coups, reflecting this interdependence. Ethnic antagonism, however, was unrelated to rapid development, confirming that these are distinct forces.
CONCLUSIONSAND FUTURE DrnCTIONS
Ethnic antagonism rooted in cultural diversity and competition between the two largest ethnic groups is a central force behind military coups. Earlier contentions about the destabilizing effects of ethnic dominance (Jackman 1978; Johnson et al. 1984) or the irrelevance of ethnicity (Barrows 1976; Wells and Pollnac 1988) appear erroneous. Ethnic dominance created stability, presumably through greater social integration and reduced competition for resources. It also boosted electoral turnout and helped legitimize the early civilian regimes. Dominance also seems to have created slightly more factionalism within the early civilian elite but this is less clear. In general, states with large hegemonic ethnic groups with strong dominance in the cabinet deterred challengers while states with extensive ethnic diversity and strong competitor groups were more prone to coups. These ethnically diverse and competitive states were also more likely to have mobilized citizens and strong military establishments, thereby indirectly increasing the likelihood of coups.
Is this destabilizing effect of ethnicity a distinctive African problem? In a global analysis of military coups, Thompson (1973) found that ethno-linguistic diversity and the potential for separatist movements were not systematic sources of coups. Yet, as our analysis and numerous case studies have shown (cf. Horowitz 1985, p. 443-525) , ethnic rivalries have been a major factor in African coups. Thompson's conclusion, however, is based on an analysis of large-scale secessionist movements. Except for Nigeria and Zaire, such mass-based challenges have been rare and generally irrelevant in African military coups. Moreover, religious cleavages in most African states do not overlap ethnic divisions. In fact, McGowan (1975) found that mass instability is not strongly related to elite instability in Black Africa. The African coup typically arises from a particular military unit or an officer clique contesting the ethnic privileges or claims of a civilian government or another set of officers (Kennedy 1974) . While communal riots and the maneuvering of ethnic politicians may help to stir ethnic sentiments, thereby precipitating coups, mass-based ethnic mobilization is probably only loosely tied to military coups. The ethnic struggle in African military coups is more of a elitebased conflict over the spoils of political rule rather than a mass struggle over the territorial boundaries and policies of the state. While underlying ethnic structures are critical in creating these contexts, the major actors are elite groups.
If this is the case, an important extension would be to examine systematically the ethnic composition of military units and the officer corps and compare this with civilian political leaders. Presumably diversity and competition within the military and the government is critical. Except for the cabinet competition measures in our ethnic antagonism variable, our analysis has dealt with general population distributions and competition ratios.
Our strongest and most consistent finding was that the political centrality of the military rooted in an Africanized officer corps and strong claims to state resources is a major source of military coups. In a sense, this is not a surprising finding. A strong military is more likely to intervene. The puzzle is to explain the origins of military centrality. Our evidence indicates that economic dependence, ethnic diversity, and political factionalism all contribute to a large and autonomous military. Export-dependent enclaves and states in which foreign capital penetration is more developed are more likely to have strong military establishments, supporting the claims of dependency theory. Ethnic antagonism may also have created greater control problems, thereby producing a stronger military. It may also be that strong military establishments stem from colonial experiences, such as the size of the standing military at independence.
An argument that we have not explored is that military centrality is based on the international politico-military ties of African states, especially infusions of military assistance and equipment. Our evidence on debt dependence is suggestive of this idea. In the 1970s, several Black African states underwent rapid militarization, building large military establishments and purchasing armaments from the developed countries (Mullins 1987) . These military establishments were largely used for internal control rather than to protect territorial boundaries, creating several garrison states. In a study of U.S. foreign aid, Mueller and Zimrnermann (1987) found that military assistance to LDCs created elite instability, strengthening the military and providing external controls over government officials. Yet the influence of these external controls is com~lex. Several of the former French colonies have maintained military ties to France and continue to rely on French troops to block coups and suppress rebellions, thereby stabilizing these regimes. The complex interplay between international alliances, military aid, and the size and political role of the military deserves a full analysis.
Dependency theory receives a mixed evaluation. On the one hand, all three types of economic dependence contributed strongly to military centrality and indirectly to coups. Debt dependence is a direct source of coups, probably because of its links to military purchases and foreign aid. Yet these dependencies were also associated with economic development, at least in the irnmediate post-independence period. Since our measure of rapid development emphasizes industrialization rather than actual growth, the growth effects are unclear, but it appears that dependence did not create destabilizing economic problems that brought on military coups and governments. Others have found export vulnerability to be an economic benefit in the imrnediate post-independence period and that foreign capital penetration created industrial growth, whose long-term effects are unclear (McGowan and Smith 1978; Bradshaw 1985; Bradshaw and Tshandu 1990 ; but see Bornschier and ChaseDunn 1985, pp. 95-101) . Perhaps these dependencies were a short-term economic advantage that will prove destabilizing in the long run.
The idea that a participation "explosion" destabilized these regimes, producing mass protest and military coups, has been a popular theory. Our evidence, however, is consistently negative. Political participation in the early post-independence era was stabilizing, partially because it legitimized democratic regimes and created strong one-party regimes. Participation and social mobilization were rooted in ethnic diversitv and competition, not rapid development. Several other studies of African coups have also found negative evidence (Jackman 1978; Collier 1983; Johnson et al. 1984) . This line of argument should be laid to rest as an interpretation of praetorianism. Yet there is evidence that political factionalism creates elite instability. Factionalism, however, is rooted in ethnic antagonism and economic dependence rather than the strains of rapid development.
The appeal of this theory comes from echoing the rhetoric of the coup makers who blame the aroused masses and corrupt politicians. It also captures an element of the problem of political order, namely, the instabilities generated by ethnic antagonism. In a sense, there is a genuine participation problem in Black Africa. Ethnic conflicts are frequently over nondivisible goods, such as prestige and control over scarce govemmental positions. Economic problems may well create a zero-sum conflict that can onlv be resolved by force. Irreconcilable demands ;ay well make "departicipation" appealing to elites. None of the Black African states has been highly successful in building strong inclusionary regimes and yet, if our underlying argument is correct, this type of political institution-building is a precondition for sustained economic and social development. An aspect that we have not explored is the types of military coups. Some coups were essentially soldiers' revolts for improving salaries and conditions (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in 1963).Others grew out of the personal aspirations of military leaders and weak civilian governments (e.g., Mobutu in Zaire). Some coups have been conservative, attempting to preempt possible leftist moves (e.g., against Gen. Buhari in Nigeria). Others have been reform coups, opening the way for neo-populist programs (e.g., Lt. Rawlings in Ghana). Some have rested on external force (e.g., the overthrow of Bokassa in the Central African Republic). Conceivably these various types of coups have distinctive sources. In view of our success in explaining all coup events with a single set of structural variables, however, we thinkit more fruitful to assume that they have common structural origins.
The military is clearly on the march across Black Africa. In many respects, the problem of the "soft state" that Myrdal diagnosed two decades ago remains the central development issue. So long as civilian governments lack a political framework for incorporating the masses, they will be unable to sustain economic and social development. Military coups and the perpetual oscillation between a "weak and powerful, a repressive and feeble, a fragile and-an absolutist" state (Chazan et al. 1988,p. 38) Momson et al. (1972 Momson et al. ( , 1990 .
From McGowan and Johnson (1985) . From Taylor and Jodice (1983) .
From World Bank (1985) .
" From United Nations (1986).
Unstandardized maximum likelihood estimates.
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